My current work can be divided into three broad areas. First, I'm interested in questions about values in science. Specifically, I look at the role that non-epistemic values (such as social and ethical values) play in the scientific enterprise, and what that means for scientific objectivity and integrity. In an ongoing project I ask what epistemic obligations scientists have towards society, and bring a virtue-epistemological/ care-epistemological perspective to public-facing science. Second, drawing on the work of Bas van Fraassen on epistemological stances and voluntarism, and I'm interested in the meta-philosophical issue of choice of philosophical stance(s) (parallel to "theory choice" in science). In a recently completed work, I propose a pluralist approach to stance choice, arguing that we needn't be committed to a single stance but should rather be open to adopting multiple stances in different contexts, depending on the goals at hand. Finally, I work at the intersection of (history and) philosophy of science and science education and have published articles on implications of scientific (anti) realism to science education, as well as on virtue epistemology, pseudoscience, and science education. I also regularly co-teach a course for future elementary school teachers with a scientist, where we bring together issues in philosophy of science and science education, and (physical) science content. This area is thus a key part of both my research and teaching. Virtue epistemology and pragmatism form undercurrents in my work in all three areas.


Peer-reviewed articles

• 'Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism' Synthese 202, 184 (2023)
• 'A Virtue Epistemological Approach to the Demarcation Problem: Implications for Teaching about Feng Shui in Science Education' – with Weimin Sun – Science and Education Vol 30 (August 2021), pp. 1421–1452.
• 'The Value of False Theories in Science Education' – Science and Education Vol. 28 (March 2019), Issues 1-2, pp. 5 - 23.
• 'What’s so special about empirical adequacy?' – with Nancy Cartwright – European Journal for Philosophy of Science Vol. 7, Issue 3 (October 2017), pp. 445 – 465.
• 'Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliablism' – Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A Vol. 64  (August 2017), pp. 22 – 29.
• 'The Rationale Behind Pierre Duhem’s Natural Classification' – Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A Vol. 51 (June 2015), pp. 11-21.

Edited volumes

‘Unconceived Alternatives and Scientific Realism’ – co-edited with Ian James Kidd – Synthese Vol. 196, Issue 10 (October 2019)

Book Reviews

Discovery and classification in Astronomy by Steven J. Dick – Philosophy of Science Vol. 82 No. 3 (July 2015), pp. 520-525.

Works in progress

My larger project is to develop a unified axiology of science by integrating discussions of values in science with those of epistemic virtues in scientists. My motivating question is, moral virtues/ obligations aside, what lessons from virtue epistemology can we apply to scientists working on socio-scientific issues? More specifically, how can epistemic virtues shape value-laden scientific decisions? What 'other-regarding' virtues (virtues that promote others' epistemic wellbeing) can we reasonably expect of scientists? How can care epistemology help make sense of scientists' epistemic obligations to others in say, science communication, community-based participatory research, or policy-related advisory work? My currently ongoing work on care epistemology and public-facing science is a part of this larger project.

Another project I'm working on focuses on the implications of scientific pluralism and contingentism (as opposed to inevitabilism, as distinguished by Ian Hacking) to science education. 

Selected Talks

•  A Care-Epistemological Conception of Public-Facing Science – Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice, Columbia, SC, May 2024
• A Virtue-Epistemological Rejection of the Value-Free Ideal – Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology annual Conference at UT Austin, August 2022 (Online)
• Pragmatic Scientific Realism: Values, Aims, and Stances – 'Alternative Approaches to Scientific Realism' Conference at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU, Munich, April 2021 (Online)
• Revisiting the Empirical Stance: What's so Special about Epistemology? – Invited talk at the 'Reconsidering Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science' Workshop at the University of Bristol, April 2021 (Online)
• Science as a Liberal Art: Invited panelist at the Homi Bhabha Center for Science Education, TIFR, Mumbai, India, January 2020
• Values in Science Education: A Critical Appraisal of ‘Nature of Science’ in the Next Generation Science Standards – International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching Group biannual conference, Thessaloniki, Greece, July 2019
• Values in Science and Philosophy – from Philosophy of Science-in-Practice to Philosophy-of-Science in Practice – ‘Get Real!’ History and Philosophy of Science Conference, Leeds University, September 2017
• What's so special about empirical adequacy? (Invited) – with Nancy Cartwright and Bas van Fraassen – UC San Diego Science Studies, April 2017
• Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism – Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting, Atlanta, GA, November 2016
• The Many Shades of Pragmatic Realism (Invited) – Department of Philosophy at Oakland University, Detroit, MI, November 2016
• Values and Theory Choice: Some Parallels Between Philosophy and Metaphilosophy of Science – (Invited keynote address) VII CSUN Philosophy Student Conference, April 2016
• Why not to aim for Truth in Theory – with Nancy Cartwright (Invited) – Workshop on Non-Alethic Aims of Inquiry, University of St Andrews, Scotland, October 2014
• Plausibility as a Cognitive Value – Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice, Toronto, Canada, June 2013
• Ontological Plausibility as a Desideratum in Theory Evaluation – British Society for Philosophy of Science, Exeter, UK, July 2013
• In Search of Norms for Privatized Science – UT Dallas Center for Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology, April 2012
• Duhem and Conditional Plausibility Realism – Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Philosophy Graduate Conference, April 2012

Grants and Fellowships

• CSUN Research, Scholarship and Creative Awards Grant – Spring 2018, Spring 2019, Fall 2019, Spring 2022
• CSUN College of Humanities Faculty Fellowship Research Grant – Fall 2016, Fall 2017, Fall 2018, Spring 2024
• CSUN Philosophy Department Research Reassigned Time – Spring 2024
• CSUN Research Leave – Spring 2023
• CSUN College of Humanities Probationary Faculty Research Support Grant – Summer 2017, Summer 2018, Summer 2019
• CSUN Probationary Faculty Support Program Research Grant – Spring 2016
• UC San Diego Science Studies Program Dissertation Fellowship – Fall 2014, Fall 2013
• UC San Diego Department of Philosophy Dissertation Fellowship – Spring 2013; Fall 2012; Spring 2012